Mainstream Personal Identity, Marginal Identity Politics, and the Fringe

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Introduction

Within society there are a series of vicinages, each with a cultural center determined to champion its instituted freedom of will in trade and human rights. This resolve is exemplified in the seasonal fashion trends modeled on the runways of world-system commerce and policy. This determination is in direct response to a flux between two types of societal shifts: virtual and actual. Virtual shifts are cognitive adjustments made in consideration to a schemata believed to enhance the fruition of a desired life “style.” Virtual shifts are caused by a manufactured vision of culture. Actual shifts are behavioral adjustments made in consideration to a schemata believed to enhance a desired life experience. Actual shifts are caused by a maneuvered sense of culture. The frequency of flux between the shifts (in society) prompts debate concerning a cultural center's ability to obtain control over virtuality and actuality in maintaining a sense of freedom. To state the concern more succinctly, conservatives and liberals strategize, make agendas, to deter or to defend life style and experience.

Conservative agendas revolve around a personality of virtual (cognitive) solidarity. Liberal agendas revolve around a politic of actual (behavioral) solidarity. Both conservative and liberal agendas, by contrast of power, instigate virtual and actual shifts within the cultural center; however, neither agenda have developed a constant solution to prevent shiftiness. This is due to the conservative relying on the adherence to virtue and the liberal relying on the opportunity to act; neither can sustain a moderate viewpoint of toleration. What is produced from these agenda are non-solutions on how to best influence flux, and to fuse an ethic to the cultural center, either by forcefully enticing the “Other” to join the flow of the mainstream, or casting the “Other” aside to the margin—a power struggle to say
the least. Those not willing to join (fuse to) an opposing and/or irresolute flow (flux), nor are interested in peripheral ventures, are virtually and/or actually sent to the fringe of the cultural center to seek an alternate form of agency. Such distanced communities also compete to develop an oppressive or influential modus operandi system (MOS) to stabilize a will that counters the perceived social imbalance of change.

A cultural center, composed of its mainstream in relation to its margins in relation to the fringe, leads itself towards an agenda that champions a shift not only to counter balance flux and fusion, but also constitute anthropomorphically an ethic in the form of a public image. This ironic attempt at creating a metaphor that composes a unified reality produces gridlock, confusion and disenchantment with virtuality, which also produces cynicism due to the reminder of actuality. The failed attempt brings forth the call from the community for leaders and heroes to instill in the will of the people a transformation sturdy enough to prevent a domino of shifts. The result of such calls is the formulation of garrisons of alliances—consortiums. These consortiums become involved vigilantly in various forms of spin-doctoring to get their agenda regarding trade or human rights noticed by the public, be it in the method of advertising or reporting through the multimedia. Some consortiums would go so far as to resort to extreme measures to raise their agenda as a pillar in the vicinage.

What has and is evolving from the manufaction and maneuvers throughout every vicinage is a full-scale cultural war over what kind of image is to be supported, reproduced and marketed to the public. This essay reveals the tectonics of conservative and liberal agendas, describes the basic use of pundits as leaders/champions of a particular agenda and as shapers of perspectives/builders of control. Lastly, the essay explores the composition of the fringe.
Mainstream Personal Identity, Marginal Identity Politics

The conservative community, because its members follow a dogma, is modern. The dogma prescribes the goal of becoming the model citizen, prototypical of the cultural center. Although modernism is abstract, factually nebulous like the sciences, the concept has been accepted since universities and popular culture have been able to promote a collective history through virtual reality. The result is that this modular community finds refuge and privacy in the “common knowledge:” esoteric discreteness encoded in a vernacular.

By accepting virtual thought, the conservative does not base identity upon an actual tradition perse; the identity is personalized idiomatically into a public image that is supported by the community. Not wanting to be perceived as antisocial to those with dissimilar cognitive conventions, the modernist uses a language comprised of catchall phrases. These phrases are monitored by a conventional wisdom council: a group of mainstream personalities who understand the center’s nuances in relation to other communities who are interested in the trade of ethics. These nuances are documented by the council to statisticize a trend; the idiomatic expressions that mark a long standing flux are to be fused in the vicinage’s canon: a template to guide interests. It follows then that such communities are bonded by sycophantic respect so to fortify identity and protect privacy. For these mainstream types of relationships, a virtual agenda becomes a familial norm, civilizing a personal identity.

The liberal community, bonded factional branches of marginalized traditions and perspectives, are postmodern. That is not to say that liberals are beyond modernism as a concept, but that liberals are beyond modernism in actuality because such communities do not have a mass quantity of support to be considered modular. A noticeable and statistical minority, the marginalized have an identity that is least favored of the cultural center’s agenda. The favoritism occurs because of the minority’s unconventional manner of style. This makes the minority’s experience virtually impossible to handle the competitive challenges of placing an image consistent with the cultural center in the public’s eye. Dispersed by
displacement, each faction survives by maneuvering the actuality of their values: practice their indigenous heritage in the context of the public image. Not having a significant place within the cultural center, nor having the immediate wherewithal to protect their space from imposed perceptions, the environment in which marginal life experience resides, their existence, in comparison to the central culture, has such little impact on mainstream lifestyle that the marginalized are considered to be plagued with inadequacies, and therefore wrong/bad, not worth manufacturing.

On a quest to find a greater sense of community beyond their immediate surroundings and to be included within the cultural center, liberals seek out those who speak from the same experiential language to find a sense of social significance. This sense is intuited from the catch phrases used to position tangible responses/reactions to the cultural center's agenda. From partaking in the actual, a network of trust forms. This trust is based on the other's description of issues concerning the center's agenda. When there is accordance with life experience caused by alienating virtual thinking, actuality is postulated, testified and from there contrived to ensure their human rights. These shared senses of experience construct marginal vicinages of cordial norms that are expressed through identity politics.

Identity politics, the common issues that bond the community, becomes eventually a nomadic form of established solidarity. As long as the issue is pertinent to the championing of the community's experience as a desire to change public image to make the cultural center a more inclusive place, then the community will remain cohesive. As soon as there is a transition from shared sense to public image, the community gathers conflicting perspectives of identity. Deconstruction of the original agenda ensues as each member takes issue with the community to try to figure a way to transform their virtual shift into an agenda that will best meet their actual needs. A consensus is drawn. If the issues are slated into an agenda, then these postmodernists will have taken the first step in building a more sturdy foundation to challenge and compete against mainstream sensibility.
Happy Punditing

While conservative and liberal communities formulate their separate identities, they do search for leaders to champion their way of life. They turn to pundits who are skilled in challenging opposing agendas in the public realm. Conservatively, the Mainstream Personal Identifier (MPI) and liberally, the Marginal Identity Politico (MIP) process issues and agendas that propagate the confronting agenda. Each pundit embarks on a character crusade; they make appeals to the better interests and senses of the public’s perception of image. If such appeals do not gain enough attention to their cause, the pundits will begin hurl epithetical ad hominems at their target for effect, hoping that the media will exploit the moment, transform it into an event.

Progress, to get a point across, pundits use a sophist’s tactics: executing logic and shock ploys to label their position. Not only attacking their nemesis, these polemicists prey on the audience’s fears, attitudes and beliefs. The goal is to force the public to make a decision (pro or con) about an issue (agenda item). Living for a debate, pundits essentially haggle for power over the image of the cultural center. Bringing a type of celebrity to the issue of the day, pundits help constituents of the community maintain their reign over the cultural center. While there is a serious competition for freedom of will, the spectacle of punditry turns conscientious controversy into sport.

Team Strategies and Players

Looking first at the MIP, debate consists of what one does or does not have, and how does one get what is wanted in order to fulfill one’s experience (experidyll). The object of want is usually something that is felt to be deserved, something that should be granted as a part of basic human rights. The MIP tends to use an avant-argument comprised of temporal, intellectual pugilism and guided by political correctness to bring an agenda to the attention of the public.
Perceived as a belligerent person, the MIP is not concerned with anyone except those who are in accordance with the promotion of an actual shift. The reason for this belligerent attitude is that the MIP is scarred from some former physical or psychological oppression caused by a virtual shift. Thus, some one else's loss of rights and scarring is inconsequential because the MIP believes that his/her networked faction has not been offered, or has been denied some form of retribution from the oppressor. Therefore, innocent (naive) bystanders who are negatively effected by MIP punditry are considered to be a means towards the cause of a righteous end: essentially, experiencing what it is like to be, insight into the actuality of being...

Taking a closer look at the MIP, one would discover that this postmodern player is not interested in who is being attacked, but what: systemic institutions that favor an attitude particular to an exclusive type of person. Stuck on images of behaviorisms, the MIP does not mind, actually prefers to coach the community of teammates who have to play the game according to cultural center rules, and manage they best they can. The MIP would rather assist the folk as opposed to challenge directly a formidable opponent. As coach, the hope is to stir the community into an advocacy role, making the agenda an actuality of action; MIP community-building is not an act of conversion, but a sermon for support in future ventures to change the experience with the cultural center. From sharing in their pain/bitterness, the MIP can help another heal. Attempting to revive a sense of actualized identity from this healing process, the MIP recuperates from the physio-psychological trauma, and makes preparations for the next shift.

Having no desire to change living habits due to experiential beliefs, the MIP, to a certain extent, does not look for solutions (an end to a type of behavior), just better forms of protection (safeguards from having their mentality challenged). What is sought from those outside the experience is some form of empathetic understanding, and/or monetary and/or legislative compensation to make sure that the impingement on identity (free will) does not
happen again: to be included significantly as an influential part, if not the primary identifier of the ethic in the cultural center. This maneuver, the liberal pundit’s progress, implicates that pluralist materialism and multicultural power (re)distribution by capitol brokerage is the primary motivation of the MIP.

Cultural sterility through the manufaction of pre-established images is the primary motivation of the MPI. The goal is to preserve the mores of a lifestyle. Totalitarian viewpoints generated from popular economics are unleashed upon factional agendas. The conservative player approaches debate by displaying the integrity of the presiding, inherent community. Regardless of the issues concerning a particular agenda, the MPI emphasizes references to either a spiritual deity, modern intellectual, prominent ethic, or a coagulated notion of all three. Even so, entrenched in expository evidence, the strategy requires that the MPI rally emotions, renew faith in an orthodox fusion and collect dispensation be the contribution volunteered time and/or space, and/or donated monies towards the proposed business at hand: trading ideals of power.

Ironically, the conservative pundit’s progress, in debate, is to piecemeal rebuttals from MIP conjectures; the conservative scrutinizes every aspect of the liberal’s agenda, disproves the issues involved, and then offers a satirical generalization about a marginal actuality. The conclusion is that the marginalized do not know how to make use of their granted rights—either they are wasted or abused—so for them, the fewer rights the better until exemplary progress is shown. This tactic, steeped in coagulated notions, is the best line of offense. If all else fails, the MPI will engage in stealth operations, be they virtual or not in order to compromise the position of their nemesis.

Preferring not to do away with cultural difference, moderns wish only to regulate virtual shift and relegate the lesser modular beings. The MPI believes that there are those who are meant to lead, and those who are meant to follow. Therefore, the MPI is more interested in who is being attacked, and by whom, not what. How who is influenced determines the
virtuality of the shift and the course of action to be taken that causes an effect that will be biased towards conservative interests: a tangible, narrowly defined point of censure. The bias is promoted by evoking esoteric schemata so that the who can be saved from the anti-virtualist what, being whatever.

After the who has been saved from what, and gains a working knowledge of “what was and who is,” the MPI begins to maintain rule over the “fallen, now born again” identity by controlling the will. Manufactured transitions that stimulate transactions and simulate transformation of common knowledge are utilized to conserve (main)streamlined livelihood. Thus the opportunity to facilitate a who-serfdom by sleighing the activity of the multi-headed monster—forcing the body politic to become part of the central culture—is the MPI’s ultimate intention.

**The Fringe: Militia Gangsterism and Free Agency**

From debate (will power competition), conservatives and liberals outline their agenda and place boundaries around their communities, welcoming those who agree, and daring those who take issue to come forth and cross the line. However, there are those who do not recognize such divisions (factions) of identity. There are some communities that refuse to participate in the vacillation between MPI and MIP punditry; in these communities, values are not directly based within the ethics involved in controlling cultural center style or extolling peripheral experience. An alternative community is considered. There are two types of alternatives: militia gangsterism and free agency.

An exclave, the militia gang, fused to an ideology, is opposed vehemently to any derivative form of outline or boundary other than what has been vaguely designated by who they are as a people. Disinterested in the fluctuation of time and space in relation to a mainstream/marginalized image, the militia gang obsesses for duration and place: significant meaning from which an orthodox ethic can be drawn and modus operandi system (MOS) brought to fruition. Quasi-culturalists, the gang evokes the extreme of any agenda. Immersed
in zealous reaction, this gang is on the edge and fantasizes about the turmoil brought about by the forces of the cultural center. This discontent being enough reason to enforce the will of their special interests in the most peculiar and extreme manners, the militant creates chaos where there is no recognition of their ideology.

Radical pontification on behalf of idealism is standard for this agitated echelon. Because this alternative group overextends their understanding of virtuality and actuality, debate takes the form of terrorized argument. Such reactionary statements make obvious what is missing in this fringe mentality: a semiotic that is able to reify identity (neo-will) in conjunction with the complexities and contradictions brought about by manufactured trade and maneuvered human rights.

Free agency, an enclave, disassociates themselves from conservative and liberal agendas. Their ethics are not focused on the fluctuations and fusions as conjured by shift manufaction and maneuvers; their interests are in speculation and performance. This alternative group investigates shifts in time and space to find a trend that could progress their special interest. Free agents do not seek a genuine connection with virtual or actual images. They only want to understand the mechanics behind the images and serve as a catalyst for the shift so that progress can be made without outlining an agenda or placing boundaries or assuming a role of leadership. They view themselves as having a non-distinct identity in relation to the cultural center and periphery, a crypto-will that desires to shape shifts.

Shape-shifters are those who do not want what others do: to practice a profession of belief consistent with the reigning public image; they are kin to morph MPI and MIP issues and agendas, to hide their true thoughts and feelings. Using an ulterior modus operandi system (MOS), free agents/shape-shifters are observers of anarchy: chaotic causes and effects. These observations are researched to determine the direction of the flux and to find the most acceptable point of fusion in regards to extended time and space. Through contrived
mimicry, these trend-setting morphologists survey agendas, study the issues associated with image and perception in order to capitalize from the transformation of the cultural center. Derivative growth—to build or renovate through an arbitration of trade and/or human rights, free agency appropriates and exploits conservative and liberal efforts to avoid confrontation.

**Summary—Survival**

Mainstream personal identity, marginal identity politics and the fringe—attempt at surviving conflict through some form of resolution: a virtual or actual mechanism, a seasonal or sporadic application of ethics on one’s own or the other’s will. Mainstream personal identity attempts to oppress culture by manufacturing a style for public image. The marginal identity político attempts to influence culture by maneuvering the perception of public image to incorporate experience. Militia gangsterism attempts to enforce an ideology by destroying culture that does not fit into the ethical parameters. Free agency attempts to morph culture, allowing for the continuance of a hidden agenda. These are attempts to find one’s center, one’s spirituality and meaning, one’s safety and security as shift happens.

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References:


